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We examine the impact of buyer-supplier relationships within business groups on capital goods trade 
by taking  into account potential simultaneous effects of business group  ties  on  foreign direct 
investment. We posit that 1) foreign affiliates of business group firms have a greater propensity to 
import capital goods from the home country, increasing home country exports; 2) if the establishment 
of overseas affiliates by business group firms attracts foreign direct investment by their capital goods 
suppliers, business group ties are localized and the ‘trade creating’ impact of business group ties may 
disappear or even be reversed. Empirical analysis of capital goods imports by 1790 manufacturing 
affiliates operated abroad by Japanese multinational firms, combined with information on linkages 
with machinery suppliers within horizontal and vertical business groups, provides broad support for 
these predictions. Our findings suggest that it may be incorrect to infer from the absence of a simple 
relationship between business group ties and trade that such ties are unimportant; instead, intra-group 
ties may be replicated abroad through foreign direct investment.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been substantial interest in the influence of inter-firm ties within business groups on 
international trade flows (see e.g. Rauch, 2001). Studies have suggested a trade creating impact of 
business  networks  through  intra-group  dissemination of information on overseas business 
opportunities, easier contract enforcement within business groups, and  cross border replication of 
vertical trade relationships (e.g. Combes et al., 2005; Rauch, 1996; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1998; 
Greaney 2003). In the context of Japanese business groups (keiretsu) the emphasis has in contrast been 
on the potential trade reducing effects, in particular of trade with firms outside the business group. 
Spencer and Qiu (2001) show that network ties within business groups can indeed reduce imports, but 
that this effect can derive from efficiency enhancing behavior in buyer-supplier relationships. Buyers 
and sellers in vertical trade relationships may prefer to invest in rent creating relationship-specific 
investments to improve transaction efficiency. The sunk nature of these investments creates switching 
costs and reduced purchases from unrelated - and thus- foreign suppliers.
1   
Business group ties do not only affect trade, they also influence foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions. Prior investments by member firms in a location may create informational externalities and 
reduce uncertainty concerning the cost and benefits of investment locations to other firms within the 
group. Investments may  also  lead to agglomeration externalities through the local  provision of 
specialized intermediates and services and by inducing training of specialized labor. There is ample 
evidence supporting the notion that these factors cause Japanese business group members to cluster 
their foreign investments abroad (Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al, 1995; Belderbos and 
Sleuwaegen, 1996; Blonigen et al., 2005; Martin et al, 1999; Smith and Florida, 1994, Henish and 
Delios, 2001; Belderbos et al., 2011).     3 
Although the (potential) impact of business group ties on both trade and FDI has been established, 
prior empirical research has not taken FDI and trade into account simultaneously.
2  In this paper, we 
demonstrate that the trade and FDI effects of business group ties are intrinsically linked, and that this 
interrelation can lead to ambiguous effects of business group ties on trade. We extend the analysis of 
the trade effects of business groups by focusing on the import behavior of the foreign affiliates of 
Japanese firms. Empirically, we assess how existing relationships of firms with machinery suppliers 
within vertical and horizontal Japanese business groups (keiretsu) influence the import trade behavior 
of the firms’ foreign affiliates, while we take into account that business group ties can at the same time 
induce FDI by the machinery suppliers. Foreign affiliates of business group firms are likely to exhibit 
a greater dependence on imports from Japan due to existing long-term  trade  relationships with 
intra-group machinery suppliers in Japan. However, when the machinery producers of the business 
group follow their client firm in relocating manufacturing operations abroad, imports are substituted 
for  by  machinery purchases from the overseas plants of the group machinery  suppliers, and the 
positive impact on imports of business group ties may disappear. This is not because networks ties are 
not important, but because network ties are replicated abroad. In an analysis of capital goods trade by 
1790 overseas manufacturing affiliates of Japanese multinational firms, drawing on unpublished data 
from an official survey conducted by the Ministry of Economics Trade and Industry (METI), we find 
broad support for these arguments.     
We examine affiliates’ imports of capital goods, i.e. manufacturing machinery. From several 
perspectives, we see this as an interesting focus to examine the role of business group ties on trade. 
Capital goods exports have also been responsible for an increasing share of Japan’s trade surplus, 
partly due to the investment needs of Japanese multinationals’ foreign affiliates. The main vertical and   4 
horizontal business groups include manufacturing machinery producers as member firms, and 
long-standing supplier-buyer relationships in machinery trade within business groups are likely to be 
important across a variety of industries.   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on business 
network effects in international trade and foreign investments. Section 3 describes the data used and 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and points out directions for further 
research.   
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A growing number of studies in the international economics and business literature analyze the 
role played by business or social networks in international trade and foreign investment, taking a 
variety of perspectives.
3  Greif (1993) treats social networks as an effective way of enforcing contracts 
in international trade and hence reducing opportunism. Several other studies emphasize the trade 
creating effect of networks due to dissemination of information on overseas business opportunities, 
reducing search costs across firms (Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch, 1996, 1999). Other studies examine 
effects of intra-group trade preferences and their potential exclusionary effects and impact on market 
barriers (Fung, 1991; Lawrence, 1991; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995; Greaney, 2005; Spencer and Qiu, 
2001; Head et al, 2004; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1998). Studies have examined different types of 
networks, such as coalitions between traders and their overseas agents (Greif, 1993), immigration links 
established among members of the same ethnic group (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Combes et 
al, 2005; Herander and Saavedra, 2005), and business groups such as Japanese keiretsu (Combes et al, 
2005; Fung, 1991; Lawrence, 1991; Noland, 1995; Saxonhouse, 1993; Head et al, 2004; Belderbos   5 
and Sleuwaegen, 1998).   
Theoretical models have been developed to understand the mechanisms through which business 
networks affect international trade and investment. Rauch (1996) develops a model of trade partner 
search and shows how the trade promoting role of networks, in this case Japan’s general trading 
companies (sogo shosha), can be due to economizing on search costs by member firms. Greaney (2003) 
examines the impact of business networks on both international trade and foreign investment, referring 
to the asymmetric trade and investment flows between US and Japan and the possible role played by 
keiretsu. In her model of multi-product firms with network effects, an equilibrium arises in which the 
firm from the country with strong network effects invests abroad while the firm based in the 
non-network country does not, leading to reverse imports from foreign affiliates of the network 
country firms back to the home market. McLaren (1999) models vertical long-term buyer-seller 
relationships in international trade and suggests that informal bargaining arrangements such as those 
frequently adopted among buyers and suppliers within keiretsu are better able to ensure cooperative 
investments than formal contracts.   
Spencer and Qiu (2001) also examine vertical buyer-seller relationship in Keiretsu by analyzing 
the effect of relationship-specific investments (RSI) by keiretsu parts suppliers. Parts suppliers invest 
in relationship specific assets that create rents for keiretsu assemblers by reducing assembly costs 
through their dedicated designs. If these rents are substantial and the suppliers’ bargaining power is 
sufficient to appropriate part of it, relationship specific investments will be undertaken. This RSI leads 
to a greater reliance on group procurements at home (i.e. in Japan) and a reduced range of parts 
imported from abroad. The key insight of this model is that network ties and a trade pattern biased 
against imports can arise endogenously from profit maximizing behavior of firms. Head et al (2004)   6 
test the impact of keiretsu on auto parts trade and explicitly build their model on the work of Spencer 
and Qiu (2001). They confirm that US auto parts imported by Japan are relatively lower in case 
Keiretsu parts suppliers are important manufacturers. In addition, investments by Japanese keiretsu 
suppliers in the US are found to have a positive impact on US automobile parts exports to Japan, 
which can be ascribed to reverse imports by Japanese suppliers, consistent with the prediction by 
Greaney (2003).
4 
Prior studies are mostly in agreement that the impact of business group relationships on outward 
foreign direct investment is relatively strong. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) find that existing 
foreign investments by horizontal and vertical keiretsu firms facilitate further investments by other 
member firms, which they attribute to information sharing among group member firms, replication of 
supplier linkages, and a relaxation of capital constraints. Agglomeration of group firm manufacturing 
investments likewise has a major impact on location choice by member firms (Belderbos and Carree, 
2002; Head et al., 2005; Blonigen et al., 2005; Smith and Florida, 1994; Heinz and Delios, 2001; 
Chung and Song, 2004; Belderbos et al, 2011). This clustering is accompanied by local trade linkages 
between the business group affiliates in the host countries (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2001) 
  The literature thus suggests that both FDI and trade are affected by buyer-supplier linkages within 
business groups. Below, we argue that this renders the relationship between business groups and trade 
ambiguous, with both (home bias) trade creation and as well as trade reduction as possible outcomes. 
We address this issue in the context of capital goods procurement behavior by foreign manufacturing 
affiliates of Japanese multinational firms. Elsewhere, we develop a simple model, drawing on Spencer 
and Qiu (2001) and Head et al. (2004), to illustrate the potential role of business ties and FDI on 
affiliates’ imports (Belderbos et al., 2010). Here, we present the basic logic of the arguments. If we   7 
assume that capital goods (machinery) suppliers within a business group have undertaken relationship 
specific investments to supply client firms with specialized, client adjusted, machinery, this is likely to 
allow  these client firms to reduce their  manufacturing costs. When the client firm establishes an 
overseas manufacturing affiliate, it will have a relatively strong propensity to import machinery from 
Japan due to the efficiency of the existing supply relationship. Hence, the sunk relationship-specific 
investments introduce a switching cost (e.g. Hackett and Srinivasan, 1998) that in turn increases trade 
in case the client engages in foreign investment. On the other hand, the demand of the overseas 
affiliate for dedicated machinery may induce the supplier to manufacture abroad as well to avoid 
transport and trade costs. When the machinery producers within the business group follow their client 
firm in relocating manufacturing operations abroad, imports are substituted for by  machinery 
purchases from the overseas plants of the machinery suppliers, and the positive impact on imports of 
business group ties may disappear, or be transformed into a trade reducing effect. This is not because 
networks ties are not important, but because network ties are replicated abroad through FDI. 
   
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
We test the prediction that foreign affiliates of business group firms are likely to have a greater 
propensity to import machinery from Japan, but that this effect is mitigated by investments in foreign 
manufacturing plants by the group’s machinery suppliers, using capital goods procurement data for a 
large sample of 1790 Japanese manufacturing affiliates abroad, drawing on unpublished information 
from the official Japanese survey of overseas affiliates.   
 
Data and empirical model   8 
Our main source of data is the Basic Survey on overseas business activities (MITI, 1996) 
conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in fiscal year 1995 (the year ending March 
31, 1996) and regulated under the Statistics Law of Japan. The Basic Survey is an extensive survey 
among Japanese multinational firms conducted every three years and asks firms to supply information 
for the parent firm and each of their foreign affiliates. The response rate of the survey at the parent 
firm level is 60.4 percent, but because there is good coverage of multinational firms with more 
extensive foreign operations, the coverage in terms of global affiliates is likely to be substantially 
greater, at around 70-80 percent.
5  Confidentiality issues restricted access to the fiscal 1995 wave of 
the survey. 
This survey contains detailed information on the overseas affiliates of Japanese firms, including 
their expenditures on capital goods and the sources of capital goods procurement. Affiliates in the 
survey report the value of capital goods procured for fixed capital investment projects, and distinguish 
the sources of capital goods between local procurement and imports from Japan and third countries. 
We  selected  parent  firms in the manufacturing industry and analyze the share of capital goods 
procurement coming from Japan. The survey contains data on 1790 manufacturing affiliates operated 
by 685 Japanese firms. Our focus is on potential differences in the reliance on Japanese imports 
between independent firms and members of horizontal and vertical keiretsu with intra group ties in 
machinery procurement, and the role played by manufacturing machinery producers within these 
vertical and horizontal keiretsu.
6   
More than half of these affiliates reported no capital goods imports from Japan (895), while 147 
affiliates report that all capital goods were imported from Japan. Table 1 shows the country 
distribution of these affiliates and the average capital goods import ratio from Japan by country or   9 
country group
7. Japanese manufacturing affiliates in developed countries tend to have lower import 




The dependent variable in the empirical model is the share of imports from Japan in the affiliate's 
total value of capital goods procurement.  Since this variable falls within the range 0-1 we use 
two-limit Tobit analysis to correct for left and right censoring of the dependent variable. In addition to 
the business group variables, we include a large set of control variables expected to affect the capital 
goods import behavior of foreign manufacturing affiliates at the parent and affiliate level, plus a set of 
country and industry dummies. 
 
Business Groups and intra-group machinery procurement 
We obtain information on vertical Keiretsu group affiliation from Toyo Keizai’s “affiliated 
companies data” ("Nihon no Kigyou Guruppu"). This data source contains corporate ownership 
information on more than 30,000 Japanese firms and is a source of information on vertical business 
groups. We limit analysis to large groups where the ‘core’ firm (the firm owning equity stakes in group 
firms) has at least 500 billion Yen in sales. Horizontal group affiliation data are drawn from Brown & 
Company’s (formerly known as Dodwell Marketing Consultants) “Industrial Groupings in Japan”. 
This data source classifies Japanese firms as belonging two one of the eight horizontal business groups, 
i.e. the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa, Tokai, and IBJ group. 
Group membership as such is not a defining characteristic of our model and test. The concept of   10 
RSI suggests that the analysis should only focus on group membership if it involves long-standing 
buyer-supplier linkages between the member firm (buyer) and machinery suppliers within the group. A 
first condition for this to hold is that the group should include member firms producing manufacturing 
machinery, which we investigated using the above mentioned publications and the Japan Company 
Handbooks. All horizontal groups included manufacturing machinery producers, but many smaller 
vertical groups or vertical groups in specific industries such as food processing, did not. A second 
condition is that there are important intra-group supplier-buyer relationship with respect to 
manufacturing machinery trade. We used Nihon Keizai Shimbun’s “Kigyou Keiretsu Souran” 
(Handbook of Business Groups) to investigate what the main buyers were of the identified machinery 
producers that were members of a business group. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun publication lists for 
each firm the five most important customers (client firms). This allows us to measure within-group 
supplier-buyer relationships at the affiliate level: we count the number of times that the Japanese 
parent firm of a foreign manufacturing affiliate was listed as a major client of intra-group machinery 
firms. This count can be considered a firm-level measure of the intensity of intra-group machinery 
procurement likely to involve relationship-specific investments. A drawback of this fine-grained 
measure, on the other hand, is that several (smaller) group firms that may be dependent on 
within-group machinery suppliers are not observed because they are not among the top five biggest 
clients because of a more limited procurement volume. We therefore also examine the impact of group 
membership on affiliate procurement if the investing parent firm  is not listed as major client of 
within-group machinery suppliers. We do apply a further restriction in this case: we only consider 
vertical groups if at least one of the group manufacturing machinery suppliers reports other group 
firms among its major clients. For horizontal keiretsu this was always the case. For vertical keiretsu,   11 
this procedure traced 19 groups with important intra-group machinery procurement. In sum, we 
examine whether affiliate procurement behavior is different for parent firms' that are member of one of 
the 8 horizontal or 19 vertical business groups, and for parent firms that are among the major clients of 
within-group machinery firms. 
In order to test the prediction that he impact of intra-group machinery trade relationships is 
moderated by the extent to which within-group machinery firms have invested in machinery 
production facilities abroad, we traced the foreign manufacturing affiliates of all group machinery 
producers in Toyo Keizai’s “directory of overseas Japanese companies". Based on this source, which 
has a rather complete coverage of overseas affiliates of Japanese firms, we established the number and 
location of overseas machinery manufacturing plants.   
 
Independent Variables 
We include two dummy variables, vertical group and horizontal group, indicating membership of 
one of the vertical or horizontal business groups as defined above. 434 affiliates abroad were operated 
by parent firms with vertical group links and 595 affiliates belong to parent firms with horizontal 
group links. Of these affiliates, 190 belong to parents that are members of both a horizontal and 
vertical group. In those cases, both dummy variables get the value 1. We also include further detail on 
the intensity of within group machinery supply linkages through the variables “Vertical machinery 
client” and “Horizontal machinery client”, which are the number of occurrences that the parent firm 
was listed as major client of machinery manufacturing firms in its business group. For each business 
group, we count the number of overseas machinery-manufacturing affiliates established by group 
member firms as “Vertical machinery FDI” and “Horizontal machinery FDI”, respectively. Counting   12 
the total number of overseas manufacturing affiliates is consistent with our two-country setting (Japan 
vs. ‘abroad’) and is the preferred specification if we assume that foreign affiliates of group members 
can be supplied by any group-owned machinery plant abroad. Given the high value to transport cost 
ratio in machinery trade, a broad geographic market mandate of overseas machinery plants is quite 
common. On the other hand, one can expect the impact of group machinery plants located in the same 
country as the affiliate to be larger. We therefore also split the FDI variables into the number of 
overseas machinery-manufacturing affiliates established in the same host country as the focal affiliate 
(“Vertical machinery FDI host”, “Horizontal machinery FDI host”) and the number of machinery 
manufacturing affiliates in the rest of the world (“Vertical machinery FDI other”, and “Horizontal 
machinery FDI other”).   
We include a broad set of control variables. “Parent firm size” is the logarithm of the number of 
employees of the Japanese parent firm in 1995. Large firms have more financial and management 
resources to explore international procurement channels and may be in a better bargaining position 
vis-à-vis those suppliers. We expect affiliates of large parent firm to exhibit a lower level of machinery 
imports from Japan. We also include a dummy variable “Parent machinery firm” which takes the value 
1 if the Japanese parent firm is producing manufacturing machinery. Given that these firms may 
develop their own manufacturing machinery in-house, the Japan import ratio is likely to be higher. On 
the other hand, this effect may be limited if the firm has invested in machinery plants abroad - in case 
these overseas plants also supply other overseas affiliates of the parent. We include the variables 
“Parent machinery FDI”, “Parent machinery FDI host”, and “Parent machinery FDI other”.   
We included five affiliate level variables. “Affiliate size” is the logarithm of the number of 
employees of the affiliate. The arguments for inclusion of this variable are similar to the arguments   13 
that apply to parent size. “Affiliate age” is the number of years that a focal affiliate had been in 
operation prior to the year 1996. In particular in the early years after establishment, investing firms are 
likely to rely on machinery imported from the home country. In later years, experience in finding 
suitable local suppliers and working with these to adapt machinery and service to suit the firms' need, 
should make it easier to buy from local machinery suppliers (e.g. Belderbos et al, 2001). “Affiliate 
Japanese ownership” is the logarithm of the equity stake held by Japanese parent firms in an affiliate. 
With lower equity stakes (joint ventures with local partner firms or with third country partner firms) 
international or local machinery procurement is more likely, for instance because the partner firms 
may have existing machinery suppliers it has been working with. "Affiliate local sales” is a dummy 
indicating whether the focal affiliate is local market oriented or not. Affiliates established to serve the 
local market may have a greater need to adapt their product to the local market, which may require 
tailored machinery for local manufacturing. The last affiliate characteristic is “Affiliate total machinery 
procurement”, the logarithm of the Yen value of total capital procurement made by the affiliate. The 
model suggests that the larger the level of procurement, the less likely it is that local suppliers can 
serve the demand of the Japanese buyers, and the higher the share of imported machinery from Japan. 
In addition, large value purchases may involve more sophisticated machines that are more likely to be 
imported from Japan.   
The empirical model also includes a set of 25 country dummies and 13 industry dummies (based 
on the industry classification of foreign affiliates provided in the MITI survey). The description and 
summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2, and the correlation matrix is given in the 
appendix. 
   14 
Insert table-2 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Empirical results of Tobit analysis of the ratio of capital goods imports from Japan to total capital 
goods procurement by Japanese manufacturing affiliates abroad are presented in Table 3. The table 
contains the results of four models. Model 1 only includes the horizontal and vertical group dummies; 
Model 2 adds the firm-specific indicators of within-group supplier-buyer trade. Model 3 adds the 
foreign investments of group machinery firms, and model 4 splits these investments (number of 
machinery manufacturing affiliates) in host country investments and investments in the rest of the 
world.  All four  models are highly significant as indicated by the Chi-square test statistic. 
Loglikelihoodratio tests show that the fit of the model significantly improves from model 1 up to 
model 3, but that the change from model 3 to model 4 is no significant improvement.   
Overall,  our  predictions find support in the empirical results. In model 1, the Vertical group 
dummy is positive and highly significant, while the Horizontal group  dummy is positive but 
insignificant. In model 2, the coefficient of Vertical machinery client  is not significant, but its 
inclusion does not affect the significance of the vertical keiretsu dummy. The variable Horizontal 
machinery client in contrast is highly significant and positive. The full specification is in models 3 
where the analysis incorporates the potential mitigating impact of group machinery investments 
abroad. In model 3, Horizontal group is now positive and significant (at the 10 percent level), while 
the impact of horizontal business groups on imports from Japan is further strengthened for major 
machinery client firms within the group: Horizontal machinery client remains positive and highly 
significant. The Vertical group coefficient increases substantially in size and remains strongly   15 
significant, while again there is no additional impact for reported major machinery clients within the 
group.
8  Model 3  also  confirms  the mitigating impact of machinery investments, as both  Vertical 
machinery FDI and Horizontal machinery FDI are negative and significant. In model 4, the results do 
not suggest a greater impact on imports from Japan of co-located manufacturing plants of group 
machinery suppliers. Both Vertical machinery FDI host and Horizontal machinery FDI host have the 
expected negative sign but are insignificant, while Vertical  machinery FDI other and  horizontal 
machinery FDI other are negative and significant. These results are consistent with a wider geographic 
mandate for group machinery manufacturing plants abroad, which serve group clients in several 
countries abroad. 
The estimated coefficients indicate that for vertical group member firms, the import increasing 
impact of membership is completely neutralized if group machinery firms have established more than 
20 manufacturing affiliates abroad. This is the case for 7 out of 19 vertical keiretsu in our sample. In 
these cases business group  membership  reduces  home country trade bias through foreign direct 
investment by group machinery firms. For horizontal business groups,  the intersection point for 
member firms is at 22 overseas machinery manufacturing affiliates, which is reached by all but one of 
the 8 horizontal keiretsu. However, for major client firms this intersection point is substantially higher, 
depending on the number of identified links, with a resulting positive impact on imports from Japan.   
It is also of interest to evaluate the magnitude of the impact of business group buyer-supplier 
linkages on machinery imports. Due to the censoring of the dependent variable, the marginal effects 
are smaller than the estimated coefficients.  The  calculated marginal effects  indicate that vertical 
business group membership increases the Japan machinery import ratio of a foreign affiliate by 8 
percent points, while horizontal business group membership increases the ratio by 4 percent points.   16 
For horizontal business groups, each identified buyer-supplier linkage of the parent firm increases the 
import ratio further by 4 percent points. As the maximum number of links reported for horizontal 
business group parents in the sample is two, the impact of horizontal business groups can reach 12 
percent points. On the other hand, an additional foreign machinery manufacturing affiliate established 
by machinery firms in a horizontal group would reduce the import ratio by 0.2 percent points; this 
reduction is 0.4 percent points for vertical business groups. These impacts are not trivial and apply to 
the capital goods procurement budgets of hundreds of foreign affiliates. 
The estimated impacts of the control variables generate few surprises and are largely in line with 
expectations. Parent firm size is negative and highly significant in all specifications, as is affiliate size. 
The  Parent firm machinery  dummy has the expected positive sign, but is insignificant; the FDI 
variables for machinery  parents are similarly insignificant. Affiliate age is  negative and highly 
significant, while Affiliate Japanese ownership is positive and highly significant in all models, as 
expected. Affiliate total machinery procurement is positive and highly significant, consistent with the 
stylized  model and the view that larger values  of procurement are  more likely to involve more 
sophisticated  equipment that needs  to  be  imported  from Japan.  The  Affiliate local sales dummy 
variable has the expected negative sign but its coefficient is not significant.   
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we explore the impact of buyer-supplier relationships within business groups on 
machinery procurement by foreign  manufacturing  affiliates  in the context of potential foreign 
investment by supplier firms. Machinery suppliers within the business group undertake relationship 
specific investments to supply client firms within the group with specialized machinery that allows   17 
client firms to reduce costs. If the client firm establishes an overseas manufacturing affiliate, it has a 
relatively large propensity to import from Japan due to the efficiency of the existing supply 
relationship. Hence, the sunk relationship-specific investments introduce a switching cost that in turn 
increases trade in case of foreign investment. On the other hand, when the machinery producers of the 
business group also  relocate  manufacturing operations abroad, imports are substituted for  by 
machinery purchases from the overseas local plants of the group machinery firms. The positive impact 
of business group ties on imports may disappear or can even be transformed into a negative impact. 
One may therefore find no systematic relationship between business group ties and trade, not because 
business group ties are not important, but because intra-group ties are replicated abroad.   
We test  these  predictions  on an extensive dataset  on capital goods imports by 1790 foreign 
manufacturing affiliates of Japanese multinational firms in 1996. Tobit analysis of the share of imports 
from Japan in total capital goods procurement of these manufacturing affiliates provides broad support 
for the predictions. Affiliates of member firms of horizontal and vertical business groups (keiretsu) 
with intra-group machinery buyer-supplier relationships exhibit a greater propensity to import from 
Japan compared with independent firms, but this impact is mitigated or transformed into a smaller 
propensity to import compared with independent  firms  from Japan for keiretsu of which the 
intra-group machinery producers have substantial overseas manufacturing investments. The impact of 
foreign machinery investments transforms the business group impact on imports from a positive into a 
negative effect for about one third of the vertical keiretsu and for most horizontal keiretsu members 
that were identified as having the most substantial ties with group machinery manufactures. The 
potential estimated impacts of supplier-buyers linkages within vertical and horizontal business groups 
are not trivial: they range between 8 and 12 percent points difference in the share of imports from   18 
Japan and apply to capital good procurement budgets of hundreds of foreign affiliates. 
Our findings suggest that business groups are likely to have a larger effect on trade than can be 
observed by simply relating business group (keiretsu) membership at the firm or industry level to trade 
propensities. Empirical investigation of the role of business groups  should take into account that 
intra-group trade relationships affect both trade and foreign investment, with ambiguous outcomes for 
total trade flows. It is therefore likely to be incorrect to infer from the absence of a simple relationship 
between business group ties and trade that such ties are unimportant; instead, intra-group ties may be 
replicated abroad through foreign direct investment.   
A number of avenues for further research are open, of which we mention three.  First, 
long-standing buyer-supplier relationships are also present outside vertical and horizontal business 
groups and are not only a feature of industrial organization in Japan. Future work could examine 
interrelations between trade and FDI in the context of long-term buyer supplier relationships for firms 
based in other countries. Second, another possible extension would be to simultaneously model and 
analyze  machinery imports and  FDI  decisions.  This would require more complex modeling,  and 
empirically,  the adoption of a simultaneous equation framework. It  would focus attention on the 
underlying reasons why supplier firms engage in foreign investments, which may include benefitting 
from reduced transportation costs and taking advantage of lower wages, but which may also be due to 
the bargaining power of client firms demanding local manufacturing in order to obtain the same 
service level as in Japan. Third, data limitations prevented us from studying later surveys among 
Japanese affiliates abroad. Although recent studies do not suggest that the specificity of Japanese trade 
patterns, such as the reliance of foreign affiliates on trade with Japan, is reducing (Greaney, 2009), 
strengthened competences of foreign firms and increased efforts to reduce costs through   19 
standardization (e.g. Paprzycki, 2005) are likely to have reduced the importance of existing Japanese 
buyer-supplier linkages for overseas affiliates. Replication of this type of study for a sample of 
affiliates in a more recent period would throw more light on the evolving role of Japanese business 
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Table 1. Country distribution of Japanese foreign manufacturing affiliates and average 
share of capital goods import from Japan 
 





Belgium & Luxembourg  13  3.19 
France  24  3.71 
Austrlia & New Zealand  22  7.67 
The Netherlands  15  8.67 
Spain  20  9.50 
Italy  10  10.80 
South America*  8  12.01 
South Korea  100  14.77 
Canada  16  16.26 
Great Britain  73  19.10 
United States  404  19.31 
Germany  47  19.89 
India  17  22.24 
Brazil  32  25.63 
EU other**  13  26.68 
Taiwan  137  27.55 
Singapore  104  30.52 
Mexico  23  30.79 
Malaysia  133  35.05 
Indonesia  99  36.39 
Hong Kong  62  39.37 
Thailand  150  39.55 
Philippines  38  41.45 
China  223  44.37 
Vietnam  7  60.57 
Total  1790  28.17 
 
    * South America includes: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Peru; 
    ** Europe other includes: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Sweden, Portugal, and Ireland;   24 
Table 2   
Description and summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Name  Description  Mean  Stdev 
Machinery import ratio  Share of import from Japan in total capital good procurement of the 
focal affiliate in 1995  0.28  0.36 
Vertical group 
Dummy taking value 1 if the focal affiliate belongs to a vertical 
business group of which the core firm has annual sales of more than 
500 billion Yen, at least one group machinery supplier, and at least 
one identified trade link between an intra-group machinery suppliers 
and group member firms.   
0.24  0.43 
Vertical machinery client  Number of times the parent firm of a focal affiliate is listed as major 
client of machinery firms in a the vertical business group  0.09  0.37 
Vertical machinery FDI  The number of overseas machinery manufacturing affiliates 
belonging to vertical group member firms  2.05  4.79 
Vertical machinery FDI host  The number of machinery manufacturing affiliates belonging to 
vertical group member firms in the host country  0.19  0.58 
Vertical machinery FDI other 
The number of overseas machinery manufacturing affiliates 
belonging to vertical group member firms, except for affiliates in the 
host country 
1.85  4.39 
Horizontal group 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the focal affiliate is member of 
one of the eight large horizontal business groups, which have at least 
one intragroup machinery supplier, and at least one identified trade 
link between intragroup machinery suppliers and member firms. 
0.33  0.47 
Horizontal machinery client  Number of times the parent firm of a focal affiliate is listed as major 
client of machinery firms in a horizontal business group  0.06  0.26 
Horizontal machinery FDI  The number of overseas machinery manufacturing affiliates 
belonging to horizontal group member firms  8.06  12.36 
Horizontal machinery FDI 
host 
The number of machinery manufacturing affiliates belonging to 
horizontal group member firms in the host country  0.73  1.50 
Horizontal machinery FDI 
other 
The number of overseas machinery manufacturing affiliates 
belonging to horizontal group member firms, except for affiliates in 
the host country 
7.33  11.33 
Parent firm size  Logarithm of total employment of the Japanese parent firm of a focal 
affiliate in 1996  7.64  1.80 
Parent machinery firm  Dummy taking value 1 if the Japanese parent firm of a focal affiliate 
is machinery manufacturing  0.12  0.32 
Parent machinery FDI  The number of machinery manufacturing affiliate belonging to parent 
firms in all foreign countries  0.67  1.80 
Parent machinery FDI host  The number of machinery manufacturing affiliate belonging to parent 
firms in the focal host country  0.12  0.35 
Parent machinery FDI other  The number of machinery manufacturing affiliate belonging to parent 
firms in all foreign countries except for focal country  0.55  1.59 
Affiliate size  Logarithm of total employment of the focal affiliate in 1996  5.07  1.42 
Affiliate age  Logarithm of the number of years that a focal affiliate had 
been in operation prior to year 1996  2.18  0.75 
Affiliate Japanese ownership  logarithm of the percent equity share held by Japanese parent firms in 
an affiliate  -0.37  0.56 
Affiliate total machinery 
procurement 
Logarithm of the Yen value of total capital procurement made by 
affiliate in 1995  4.66  1.93 
Affiliate local sales  Dummy variable indicating whether the focal affiliate sells it output 
on the local market  0.26  0.44 
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Table-3 Tobit model of machinery import of Japanese foreign manufacturing affiliates 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Vertical group  0.2552  0.2228  0.406  0.4108 
  [0.0480]***  [0.0510]***  [0.0745]***  [0.0749]*** 
Vertical machinery client    -0.0041  -0.0015  -0.0042 
    [0.0548]  [0.0554]  [0.0555] 
Vertical machinery FDI      -0.0193   
      [0.0059]***   
Vertical machinery FDI host        -0.0565 
        [0.0409] 
Vertical machinery FDI other        -0.0161 
        [0.0069]** 
Horizontal group  0.0407  0.0113  0.1902  0.1893 
  [0.0470]  [0.0482]  [0.1040]*  [0.1048]* 
Horizontal machinery client    0.2248  0.2133  0.2141 
    [0.0769]***  [0.0782]***  [0.0783]*** 
Horizontal machinery FDI      -0.0091   
      [0.0041]**   
Horizontal machinery FDI host        -0.0089 
        [0.0183] 
Horizontal machinery FDI other        -0.0091 
        [0.0044]** 
Parent firm size  -0.0727  -0.0751  -0.0733  -0.0735 
  [0.0133]***  [0.0134]***  [0.0133]***  [0.0133]*** 
Parent machinery firm  0.0563  0.0136  0.0494  0.0475 
  [0.0658]  [0.0683]  [0.0700]  [0.0707] 
Parent machinery FDI  0.017  0.0162  0.0075   
  [0.0123]  [0.0126]  [0.0130]   
Parent machinery FDI host        0.0122 
        [0.0637] 
Parent machinery FDI other        0.0082 
        [0.0151] 
Affiliate size  -0.0407  -0.0426  -0.0444  -0.0442 
  [0.0171]**  [0.0171]**  [0.0170]***  [0.0170]*** 
Affiliate age  -0.0849  -0.0835  -0.079  -0.0808 
  [0.0297]***  [0.0296]***  [0.0295]***  [0.0296]*** 
Affiliate Japanese ownership  0.147  0.1452  0.1463  0.1466 
  [0.0341]***  [0.0340]***  [0.0338]***  [0.0338]*** 
Affiliate total machinery procurement  0.1208  0.1216  0.122  0.1221 
  [0.0124]***  [0.0124]***  [0.0123]***  [0.0123]*** 
Affiliate local sales  -0.0616  -0.0602  -0.0634  -0.0626 
  [0.0429]  [0.0427]  [0.0425]  [0.0425] 
Constant  -0.8075  -0.7409  -0.7397  -0.7414 
  [0.2425]***  [0.2419]***  [0.2405]***  [0.2413]*** 
Country dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
         
Log likelihood  -1372.76  -1368.50  -1360.83  -1360.38 
LR Chi-square  544.36***  552.88***  568.22***  569.11*** 
Observations  1790  1790  1790  1790 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors within parentheses;   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Appendix: Correlation matrix   
 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
1  Machinery import ratio  1.00                                         
2  Vertical group  0.12  1.00                                       
3  Vertical machinery client  0.01  0.43  1.00                                     
4  Vertical machinery FDI  0.03  0.76  0.39  1.00                                   
5  Vertical machinery FDI host  0.05  0.59  0.27  0.72  1.00                                 
6  Vertical machinery FDI other  0.03  0.75  0.39  1.00  0.65  1.00                               
7  Horizontal group  -0.04 0.13  0.14 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 1.00                             
8  Horizontal machinery client  0.10  0.38  0.23  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.35  1.00                           
9  Horizontal machinery FDI  -0.04 0.14  0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.92  0.39  1.00                         
10 Horizontal machinery FDI host  -0.01 0.09  0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.69  0.30  0.72  1.00                       
11 Horizontal machinery FDI other  -0.04 0.14  0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.92  0.38  1.00  0.65  1.00                     
12 Parent firm size  -0.03 0.46  0.30  0.30  0.23  0.29  0.39  0.31  0.37  0.26  0.37  1.00                   
13 Parent machinery firm  0.05  0.22  0.01  0.06  0.09  0.05  0.35  0.36  0.41  0.29  0.40  0.20  1.00                 
14 Parent machinery FDI  0.02  0.32  0.32  0.22  0.24  0.21  0.04  0.21 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.30  0.36  1.00               
15 Parent machinery FDI host  0.02  0.21  0.18  0.15  0.30  0.12  0.05  0.16  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.18  0.36  0.66  1.00             
16 Parent machinery FDI other  0.01  0.32  0.32  0.21  0.20  0.21  0.04  0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.30  0.33  0.99  0.52  1.00           
17 Affiliate size  0.12  0.16  0.07  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.03  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.32  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.08  1.00         
18 Affiliate age  -0.19 -0.04 0.00  0.01 -0.08 0.02  0.03  0.00  0.02 -0.04 0.03  0.14  0.01  0.04 -0.02 0.05  0.23  1.00       
19 Affiliate Japanese ownership  0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.03  1.00     
20 Affiliate total machinery procurement  0.18  0.15  0.10  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.34 -0.03 0.02  0.01  0.02  0.57  0.02 -0.02 1.00   
21 Affiliate local sales    -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00  0.03  0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 1.00   27 
ENDNOTES 
                                                        
1  Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) apply this model to an empirical analysis of US auto parts 
exports to Japan, and confirm a negative impact of established ties within vertical business groups 
(keiretsu) on Japanese car parts imports.   
2  A partial exception in terms of theory is Greaney (2003). Extending the analysis of business ties to 
foreign direct investment in a two country model, her findings suggest that the country with a stronger 
presence of business groups will exhibit larger outward investments with foreign affiliates engaged in 
exports to Japan.   
3  A related literature has examined the performance consequences of business group membership and 
the role of business groups in relaxing credit constraints (e.g. Hoshi et al, 1991; Khanna and Palepu, 
1999; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995).   
4  Other empirical studies of effects of the presence of Japanese business groups on Japanese imports 
have produced mixed results, with some studies finding negative effects (Fung, 1991, Lawrence, 1991; 
Noland, 1995) while others find no significant impact (Saxonhouse, 199; Ueda and Sasaki, 1998) or 
dispute the findings of earlier work based pointing at methodological errors and definitional issues 
(Miwa and Ramseyer, 2002). 
5  Exact response rates at the affiliate level are not available for the year 1995 as METI stopped 
reporting these in the early 1990s. Response rates reported in earlier surveys showed that the affiliate 
level response rates invariably were about 20 percent higher than the response rate at the parent firm 
level (e.g. in 1991 these response rates were 78.5 and 53.1 percent, respectively). 
6  We  use the terms machinery imports and capital goods import interchangeably. Capital goods 
procurement may also partly consist of building materials for new plants. We expect little systematic   28 
                                                                                                                                                                             
variation in the share of these other expenditures besides general differences between industries. This 
would suggest that the variation is  picked up by the industry dummies, and that the focus on 
machinery suppliers is not likely to reduce the accuracy of our estimates.   
7  Dummies for countries that have very few observations (less than 5) are aggregated with other small 
country dummies in the same region. 
8  This may be related to our imperfect measurement of buyer-suppliers linkage within the group. 
Compared with horizontal business group firms, vertical business group member firms are smaller on 
average and are less likely to be listed as top five clients of group machinery firms, making this a 
much less differentiating feature of intensive buyer-supplier linkages within vertical groups. 